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ADmIRALTY-ToRTS--DuTY

TO HEED WEATHER

BuREAr WARNINGS-A

storm with a wind velocity of eighty-three miles per hour caused the scow
Moran No. 52 to break its mooring ropes and collide with several other scows
which, being thereby torn from their moorings, damaged other ships, one
being the plaintiff's. Held, that the owner and those in charge were negligent
in not heeding Weather Bureau storm warnings, although it is not stated that
the owner or those in charge knew of the warning. Osaka Shosen Kabushiki
v. U. S. Lighter No. I, D. C. E. D. N. Y., decided Jan., 1929.
The standard of care to which a man is held is, of course, that care which
a reasonable man with like skill and knowledge would exercise under the circumstances' Since a reasonable man takes extra precautions when he knows
that danger is imminent, it has been rightly held that one of the factors to
be considered in deciding whether or not the defendant was negligent is the
fact that he saw the threatening weather conditions such as storm ice,' or
flood It has also been held that the defendant having been told that storm
warnings were up is a fact to be weighed in judging his conduct, where he
also saw the storm gathering.' This is a-logical and reasonable rule. It is
difficult to see, however, how it can be said that a man acted negligently in
not heeding storm warnings of which he had no knowledge, and to place on
a bargeman the absolute duty of keeping posted on the weatier reports overlooks the practical difficulty of so doing, and would seem to require a higher
standard of care than could reasonably be expected from one in that position.
Furthermore, while disregard of a storm warning actually known is one fact
to be considered, it seems doubtful whether such warnings are sufficiently infallible to consider the disregard of a report alone, with no other facts tending
to show that the defendant acted improperly, such negligence as to impose
liability.

BANKS AND BANKING-RGHT OF BANK TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS OF A DEPOSITOR IN PAYMENT OF A NOTE MADE BY DEsosioR-The plaintiff, a depositor

in the defendant bank, sued for injury to his credit occasioned by *the refusal
of defendaht to pay a check drawn by plaintiff. The defendant proved that
prior to the refusal to cash the check, the amount of money to the credit of
"The Protector, 176 Fed. 171 (E. D. S. C. igog);
OF TORT (I9O7) §6 (2).
BoH.EN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926)
5
The Newa, 267 Fed. 115 (C. C. A. 4 th, x92o).

'The Herin, 267 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 4th, I920).
5
Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. 192 (1863).
'The Sea King, 29 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
(804)

SALmOND, THE LAW

14.

RECENT CASES
the plaintiff had been reduced by reason of defendant appropriating funds sufficient to pay a note of plaintiff's, which was held by the defendant and which
matured on the same day as the check was presented, and that the balance to
plaintiff's credit was insufficient to pay the check. Subsequently on the same
day, plaintiff had deposited an amount of money which, added to his credit at
the beginning of the day, would have been sufficient to pay both the note and
the check. Held, that the defendant bank had the right to appropriate funds from
the deposits to pay the note at any time during the day of maturity. Goldstein v.
Jefferson Trust Co., Io Pa. Super. Adv. i77 (929).
It is well settled that a bank has the right to appropriate funds deposited
with it in payment of debts owed by the depositor.' Though some courts have
considered that this right is in the nature of a lien held by the bank on the
deposits,' it is probably more proper to regard the right as partaking of the
nature of a set-off by the bank The title to the deposit is in the bank, and it
seems inaccurate to consider that one may have a lien on his own property.
Since the note is merely a debt which the maker owes to the bank, the right of
the bank to appropriate funds from the deposits to pay the note is uncontroverted.' It is further well settled that a note is due at the commencement of
business hours of the bank on the day of maturity, even though the maker or
indorser has the entire day in which to make payment It has been held that a
demand for payment, followed by refusal of the maker to pay, entitles the
holder to treat the note as dishonored before the expiration of the day of maturity.' A subsequent payment on the same day will, of course, make the dishonor of no avail.' Some jurisdictions, because of the business custom, hold
that the note may not be dishonored until the day following the day of maturity, even though it actually matures for the purpose of payment at the beginning of the day.8 It seems, however, that where the bank is the holder of
the note, a demand on the maker is unnecessary, and that the right of the bank
to appropriate from the deposits of the maker sufficient funds to pay the note,
accrues at the beginning of the day, and this in spite of the fact that such a
deduction will not leave a sufficient credit to meet checks drawn by the depos'Clark v. Northampton Nat. Bank, i6o Mass. 26, 25 N. E. io8 (1893);
Ingber v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, 230 Pa. 511, 79 Atl. 751 (1911); MoRSE,
BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 559.
'Davis v. Bowsher, 5 T. R. 488, 491 (i794) ; Batson v. Alexander City
Bank, 179 Ala. 49o, 6o So. 313 (1912).

'Irish v. Citizens' Trust Co., 163 Fed. 88o (igo8); Furber v. Dane, 2o3
Mass. io8, 89 N. E. 227 (I909).
'Bank v. Brewing Co., 50 Oh. St. 151, 33 N. E. 1054 (1893); Mechanics'

and Traders' Bank v. Seitz, 15o Pa. 632, 24 Atl. 356 (18)2).
'Gordon v.- Parmalee, i5 Gray (Mass.) 413 (i86o) ; Coleman v. Carpenter,
9 Pa. 178 (1848) ;

DANIELS, NEGoTABiyu INSTRUMENTS

'Thorpe v. Peck, 28 Vt.

127

(855);

(6th ed. 1913) §

1235.

Ex parte Moline, Ig Ves. Jr. 216

(1812).

"German-American Bank v. Milliman, 31 Misc. 87, 65 N. Y. Supp. 24
(Igoo) ; Citizens' Bank v. Lay, 8o Va. 436 (1885).
'Planters' Bank v. Markham, 6 Miss. 397 (1841); Church v. Clark, 21
Pick. 310 (Mass. 1838).
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itor. The equities in the deposits,-of the bank, as holder of the note, and of
the payee of the check,-are at least equal, and since the bank has title to the
funds, its claim prevails.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-C M ,ERCE
CLAusE-SERvicE UPON AGENTS OF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS DOING BUSINESS IN STATE-Plaintiff, now a resident

of Missouri, brings action against the defendant, a Michigan railway corporation, as administratrix of an employee who was killed in Michigan at a
time when the plaintiff lived in Michigan. Suit was prosecuted in Missouri
under a Missouri statute providing for service upon the agents of foreign corporations in the state. Defendant had no business in Missouri except that of
soliciting freight for interstate commerce through the agent who was served.
Held, that such suit was unconstitutional as a burden upon interstate commerce.
Michiqan Central Rwy. Co. v. Mix, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided February i8, 1929.
The narrow problem here presented concerns service statutes only in reference to foreign corporations, partly or wholly engaged in interstate commerce, as distinguished from other corporations or foreign non-residents doing
business in the state.' As to the former, it is settled that state statutes giving
jurisdiction over them must be sufficiently reasonable so as not to unduly burden
their interstate commercial activities.' Such statutes have been correctly held
valid in their entirety by the states as not being in violation of due process; '
but the Supreme Court has constantly indicated that the jurisdiction gained
under them is limited to cases, the causes of which arose within the same
state or as a result of business transacted there, else the commerce clause would
be violated.' And such was its decision as to a similar statute in Davis v. Farmer's Co-operative Society.! Certain dicta contained therein suggested that if the
' Schuler v. Laclede Bank, -7 Fed. 424 (1886) ; Merchants' Bank v. Meyer,
56 Ark. 499, 2o S. W. 406 (1892).
' For a discussion of this problem see Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 HAgv. L. Rxv. 871.
'Sioux

Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57 (0914). See

also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct. 190
(1910).
'Reynolds v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. R., 228 Mass. 584, 117 N. E.
913 (1917); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe v. Weeks, 248 Fed. 975 (D. C.
Tex. 1918). The broad language used may better be explained in some cases

on the ground the corporation had consented to be sued in the state, regardless
of where the cause of action arose.
'Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Buck Construction Co., 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup.
Ct. 72 (i92I); Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255
(1915).
See also Fry v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 226 Fed. 893 (N. D. Cal.
1915). And there is no difference whether service be made on the corporation's agent or on a state official named for that purpose. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe v. Weeks, supra note 3, contra.
5262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556 (1923). Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101, 44 Sup. Ct. 469 (1924)

to non-resident corporation).

(garnishment statute applied.

RECENT CASES
plaintiff were a resident of the state in which suit was brought, the court might
have jurisdiction even though the cause of action arose outside; ' and where
such were the circumstances, a district court upheld this same Missouri statute
in reliance on itC As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, the principal
case leaves unsettled the question of whether there is here a valid distinction,
for it concerns the situation only where the plaintiff sues in a state where
residence was gained subsequent to the time the action arose. The language of
the court is not broad enough to include the case of a suit by one in the state
where there existed a residence when the right of action developed.

CoPpoRATiros-GooDwI.L-RIGHT OF A MINORITY SHAREHOLDER TO DEFEAT A SALE BY THE MAjoRiTY-The majority shareholders of a prosperous

concern sold the entire tangible property of the corporation to a new company,
organized and controlled by themselves, for a fair market value but making
no allowance for the goodwill of the old concern. In an action by a minority
shareholder against the new corporation, held, that the minority shareholder
could recover her pro rata share of the value of the goodwill. Nave-McCord
Mercantile Co. v. Ranney, 29 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).

The majority shareholders of a corporation are said to be trustees for the
minority,' and therefore to owe to the minority a duty not only of good faith
but of diligence to secure the highest possible return to the corporation
This trust is imposed on the majority because the minority can act only
through them. A sale of the assets of a prosperous concern even to strangers
can be effected only by a unanimous vote of the stockholders An attempted
sale by the majority amounts to a betrayal of trust in that it is defeating the
corporate purposes.4 Such a sale is at times allowable under special statutory 5
6262 U. S. 312, 315 et seq.: "Jurisdiction . . . is asserted whatever the

nature of the cause of action, wherever it may have arisen and although the
plaintiff is not . . . a resident of the state. .

.

. It may be that a statute

like that here assailed would be valid although applied to suits in which the
cause of action arose elsewhere . . . if the plaintiff was, when it arose, a
resident of the state.'
Griffin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 28 F. (2d) 998 (W. D. Mo. 1928).
Backus v. Brooks, i95 Fed. 452 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912) ; see So. Pac. Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U. S.483, 487, 39 Sup. Ct. 533, 535 (1918) ; Carrier v. Dixon, 142
Tenn. 122, 126, 218 S. W. 395, 396 (I919). But cf. Colgate v. U. S. Leather
Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 87, 67 Atl. 657, 663 (907) ; with which cf. Morse v.
Metropolitan Steamship Co., 87 N. J. Eq. 217, 221, 100 Atl. 219, 221 (1917).
'Jones v. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 144 Fed. 765 (1906).
'Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177, 20 So. 981 (1896); People
v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269 (1892). But cf. Ervin v. Oregon Ry.& Nay. Co., 27
Fed. 625, 632 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886).
' See Note (923) 12 GEORGETOWN L. J. 49.
'Metcalf v. American School Furn. Co., 122 Fed. 115 (C. C. W. D. N. Y.
19o3) (decided under W. VA. CODE ANN. (i906) c. 53 § 2284) ; Koehler v. St.
Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa. 648, 77 Atl. ioi6 (igio) (decided under PA.
LAws 1876, 30).
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or charter 6 provisions. When the majority attempt to sell to a corporation
controlled by themselves the breach of trust is even more obvious, and the
sale may be voided by the minority.' The purchasing corporation, having obtained the property with notice, can have no rights superior to those of the
majority stockholders of the original company. Goodwill, even though intangible, may be a valuable asset. It amounts to property' and must be included
in determining the value of a corporation. In the principal case, conceding
with the court that the majority acted in good faith, the minority shareholder,
nevertheless, was deprived unjustly of her property. The purchasing company
obtained 'this unjust enrichment and very properly are held to account to the
minority. The principal case indicates a sound growth in corporation law
which, it is hoped, will be able to adequately assimilate the modem conception
of goodwill.

CORPORATIOS--STATUS OF THE LEGAL ENTITY WHERE ALL THE SHARES
ARE OWNED BY ONE MAN OR ANOTHER CoP.oRATIo-A man acquired all the
stock in a corporation, having both before and after thac time loaned money
to the corporation. The corporation having become bankrupt, he presented
a claim as a general creditor. There was no fraud in the transactions. Held,
that the claim should be allowed. Wheeler v. Trustee of Tel. Co., C. C. A. 9th,
decided Jan. 2 4 th, 1929.
The manager of the Chevrolet Motor Ohio Company and the manager
of-the General Motors Truck Company, both of which were doing business
in the northern district of Ohio, were served in a patent infringement suit in
which the General Motors Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, was named
as defendant, together with the two companies before mentioned. In a motion
by the General Motors Corporation to quash service on the ground that it
was not doing business in the district,' held, that since the General Motors
Corporation controlled and directed the Chevrolet Motor Ohio Company as its
sole share-holder, and the General Motors Truck Company through a series
of other corporations, and was using these companies as mere adjuncts, it was
doing business in the district. Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 29 F. (2d) 632 (N. D. Ohio 1928).
It is the generally accepted rule that a corporation is a legal person distinct from its share-holders, - and this distinction is emphasized by the fact that
6

Union Trust Co. v. Carter, 139 Fed. 717 (C. C. W. D. W. Va. 195o).
Glengarry Mining Co. v. Boehmer, 28 Colo. I, 62 Pac. 839 (ioo); McLeod v. Lincoln Medical College, 69 Neb. 555, 96 N. W. 265 (19o3) ; Parsons
v. Tacoma Smelting Co., 25 Wash. 492, 65 Pac. 765 (igoi).
. See Brown v. Weeks, 195 Mich. 27, 38, 161 N. W. 945, 948 (1917);
Washburn v. Nat'l Wall Paper Co., 81 Fed. 17, 20 (1897).
' For the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States in patent
infringement suits, see §48 of the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 1100 (I9I1), 28 U.
S. C. § IO9.
2
Richmond, etc. Co. v. Richmond, etc. R. R., 68 Fed. io5 (C. C. A. 6th,
1895) ; Rhawn v. Edge Hill Furnace Co., 201 Pa. 637, 51 Aft. 36o (19o2).
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it is sustained even though all the shares are owned by one person, whether
that person be another corporation 3 or an individual.' The controlling influence
resulting from stock ownership is not enough in either of these situations to
cause the overthrow of this entity theory.5 There are, however, many cases saying that the legal entity should be disregarded where the corporation is so
organized and controlled and its affairs so conducted as to make it a mere
blind, instrumentality, or agent' to aid in the consummation of wrong," to
justify a fraud or injustice,' or to defeat public convenience.' In the Wheeler
case the court accepted this rule as applicable to both classes of complete stock
ownership, and, finding no fraud or injustice in the facts, sustained the entity.
This is a just and proper result, despite the fact that other creditors were
involved. 5 The court in the General Motors case, finding an agency relationship existing between the parent and the subsidiary corporations, considered
it against sound policy to allow the parent corporation to enjoy the benefits
of doing business in such a manner without also being held to the responsibilities attached thereto. It was partially influenced by the legislative purpose to
enlarge the jurisdictional opportunities of bringing patent infringers into the
federal courts. The result reached appears to be justified by the facts, which
indicate that an agency in fact existed; but the court in sustaining its conclusion said that "the fiction of corporate entity may be disregarded" under
those circumstances. Such language is not necessary for the result reached.
The corporate entity is not a fiction and it is not necessary that it be disregarded. The court could have reached the same result by the application of
the law of principal and agent," and without resorting to the metaphysics attending an attempt to snub that which the law has recognized. And is it not
an anomaly to first disregard two corporations and then consider them, as such,
parties to the suit? An examination of the cases in which the "disregard of
3

N . Y. Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 25o Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) ; Elen-

krieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924).

'Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 2o N. W. 667 (1884) ; Sloan Shipyards
Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation,
258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (i922) ; Rhawn v. Edge Hill Furnace Co., supra
note 2; Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co., 96 Tenn. 252, 34 S. W. 209 (i896).
5Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927)

containing a review of the authorities. Commented on in (1928) 76 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 322. For discussion of the one man corporation cases, see Wormser,
Piercing the Veil of CorporateEntity (1912) 12 COT. L. Rxv. 496, 515.
*Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924).
Higgins v. Cal. Petroleum & Asphalt Co., i47 Cal. 363, 8I Pac. IO7O

(9o5) ; Brundred v. Rice, 49 Oh. St. 64o, 32 N. E. 169 (1892).
'Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139 (1865); First Nat. Bank of Chicago v.
Trebein Co., 59 Oh. St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (898).
'People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 7 N. Y. Supp.
406 (i8go). For general discussion see Wormser, loc. cit. supra note 5.
" There is a general tendency to protect creditors especially in the one man
corporation cases. See Hall v. Goodnight, 138 Mo. 576 (1897), where they are
protected by recognizing the corporate entity.
'Erickson v. Minn., etc., Power Co., 134 Minn. 209, i58 N. W. 979 (1916).
See also U. S. v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 257, 131 Sup. Ct. 387 (i911).
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the entity" language is used illustrates that this is not necessary, and that just
results could be obtained by the application of some legal or equitable principle,' especially where all of the stock is owned by an individual or another
corporation.

CRIMINAL

LAW-ADMISSIBILITY

OF A

CONFESSION OF ANOTHER

CRIME-

The appellants, having been convicted of murder in the first degree, combat
the admission of that part of their confessions which deal with a subsequent
holdup, committed with a pistol that was taken from the deceased. The objection urged is that the confession included crimes other than that for which
the defendants were being tried. Held, that the confessions are admissible.
Commonwealth v. Parker et al., 294 Pa. 144, 143 Atl. 9o4 (1928).
Apart from the evidentiary connection between the two crimes,' the admission of the confessions was undoubtedly justified under the recent Pennsylvania statute' which requires the jury "by its verdict" to fix the punishment at
death or life imprisonment. Due to the additional common law requirement
in the state that the conclusions of the jury as to both guilt and punishment be
included in a single verdict,' a particular hardship to the defendant necessarily
results.' Theoretically, the jury are supposed to determine the degree of the
defendant's guilt before assessing the punishment.5 It is inevitable, however,
that the evidence of other offenses will be used by the jury in determining the
guilt of the prisoner. At common law, and in many states by statute, this
difficulty does not arise.' The two matters of guilt and punishment are kept
entirely distinct,7--the jury determines the degree of the defendant's guilt and
then the evidence of the commission of other crimes is submitted and considered in assessing the punishment. While undoubtedly a sportsmanlike practice, the common law procedure can be criticized as being a bit too lenient
with habitual criminals. The decision in the principal case very clearly indicates a reversal of the pendulum, at least in Pennsylvania.' It is interesting
'See
1

Note

(1909)

23

HARV. L.

REV. 216; (1916)

15 MicH L. REv. 264.

Evidence of another crime, tending to prove that charged, is admissible.

People v. Clark, 70 Cal. App. 531, 233 Pac. 98o (1925) ; People v. King, 276
Ill. 138, 114 N. E. 6oi (1916); Cothron v. State, 138 Md. 1o, 113 At. 620
(1921) ; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1923) § 151.
'AcT OF MAY 14, 1925, P. L. 759, PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) § 7975.
' Panek v. Scranton Ry. Co., 258 Pa. 589, 1o2 Atl. 274 (1917).
4
See State v. English, 3o8 Mo. 695, 274 S. V. 470 (1925) (habitual criminal statute) ; People v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174, 179 (1874).
'Schroeder v. State, I7 Ala. App. 246, 84 So. 309 (1919) ; Commonwealth
v. Curry, 287 Pa. 553, 135 At. 316 (1926).
' State v. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S. V. 637 (1897); Ackers v. State, 73
Ark. 262, 83 S. W. 909 (1904).
7
Glover v. State, 76 S. V. 465 (Tex. Cr. App. 19o3).

' See the remarks of Mr. Chief Justice von Moschzisker in relation to the
CRIME CoMMIiSsIoN BILLS, 86 LEGAL-INTELLIGENCER 194 (Feb.

PENNSYLVANIA
22, 1929).
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to note to what extent these restrictive relics of the law, that have heretofore
been the mainstay of the habitual criminal in court, are being removed in favor
of more certain punishment under modern simplified practice. As stated by
Mr. Chief Justice von Moschzisker in the principal case,9 "we can take judicial
knowledge of the fact that habitual criminals have become so general that
the law, not only lex scripta but non scripta, must advance to protect society
against them."

INFANTS-DISAFFRMANCE OF CONTRACT-MUST OTHER PARTY Bz PUT
iN STATu Quo-The plaintiff sold merchandise to the defendant, a minor, who

assembled it into radio sets, sold them, and received the benefit of the sales.
The plaintiff sued for the unpaid balance, and the defendant pleaded his infancy
as a defence. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Shutter v. Fudge, 143
At. 896 (Conn. 1928).
The problem of whether an infant, in order to disaffirm a contract, must
restore the other party to his original position, has resulted in confusion in
the decisions, due to the impossibility of formulating a rule which will do
exact justice to both parties The tendency of the earlier cases was to require
the infant to return the consideration received under the contract, or its equivalent, if he had lost or squandered it,2 but these decisions have been largely overruled or limited by later cases.! The weight of judicial opinion now is that
he must restore only so much of it as remains in his hands.' The hardship of
such a situation on the adult has caused a few states, notably Minnesota and
New Hampshire, to adopt the rule that, when the contract is fair and reasonable, the infant must return what he received, to the extent of the benefit
actually received by him.' While this is a flexible rule which in some cases
will prevent imposition by the infant, it would seem to take away a large measure of the protection generally accorded him, and also to place all his contracts
on the same footing as contracts for necessaries.' The court in the principal
'At 154, 143 At. at 907.

'If the infant is in every case required to put the other party in statu quo,
his disability will amount to little, except where he has been so prudent that
he really does not need the protection of the law. If he is never required to
do it,2 an instrumnt of fraud and injustice is placed in his hands.
Bartlett v. Cowles, 15 Gray 445 (Mass. 186o) ; see Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo.
120, 125 (1869).
'Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 5o8 (1867); Craig v. Van Bebber, ioo
Mo. 584 (890).
'MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U. S. 688, 17 Sup. Ct. 961 (1897); Barr v.
Packard Motor Car Co., 172 Mich. 299, 137 N. W. 697 (1912); Green v.
Green, 69 N. Y. 553 (1877).
5
Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 16o N. W.
I9I (1916) ; Wooldridge v. Lavoie, 79 N. H. 21, 104 AtI. 346 (1918). These
courts, however, generally construe "fair and reasonable" to mean provident
and advantageous to the infant, both in terms and subject matter.
a I WrLLISTON, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1924) § 238; 3 PAGF, CONTRACTS (2d
ed. i92o) § 1623; 1 ELLIOT, CONTRACTS (1913) § 348.
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case felt that if the infant lost or squandered the consideration which he received, it was no more than the law anticipated, and he should be protected
from the ill effects of his improvidence and immaturity.7 The decision is in
accord with the vast weight of authority, and is entirely in keeping with the
general policy of protecting the property of infants8 The privilege of disaffirming a contract is accorded an infant because of the indiscretion incident
to his immaturity, and, if he were required to restore the equivalent of the
property wasted or lost, the privilege would be unavailable when needed most.
LinB. AND SLANDER-LrBEL OF A CLASS, RIGHT OF AcTION 3Y INDIvIDUALDefendants published a pamphlet naming various liberal organizations as being
closely allied with the Soviet revolutionary movement, and calling attention to
the interlocking directorates of these organizations, annexing a chart containing, along with many others, the name ofi plaintiff as director of two of the
organizations. Held (two judges dissenting), that the libel was against the
individual. Hays v. American Defense Society, 224 App. Div. 588, 213 N. Y.

Supp. 500 (1928).
Civil actions of libel are founded upon the subjection of the plaintiff, by
defendant's false and malicious publication regarding him, to hatred, contempt
or ridicule.' It is clear that a person may suffer such injury even though the
publication does not specifically refer to him by his name. Thus the action
lies where the plaintiff is referred to without being named, or by a wrong
name,' provided the description or reference sufficiently identifies him.' The
fact that the plaintiff is one of several libelled by the same publication does
not, of course, defeat the action.' Where the libel is directed against the whole
of a class, without qualification, while it is true that each member is identified,
a member cannot maintain the action unless the language is applicable to him
with such particularity as to subject him to the injury upon which the action
rests. The solution depends mainly upon the size and distribution of the class. 7
Each member of an administrative board,' or of a jury,' and each occupant of
7 See

White v. Sikes, 129 Ga. 508, 510, 59 S. E. 228, 229 (19o7).
'See Horton v. McCoy, 47 N. Y. 21, 26 (i87i); Harner v. Dipple, 31
Ohio St. 72, 73 (1876).
1

NEwF.LL, LmEL AND SLANDER (4th ed. 1924) § 2.
Palmer v. Bennett, 83 Hun 220, 31 N. Y. Supp. 567 (1894).

'Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 856, 84 N. E. ioi8 (19o8) ; Clark
v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346, 53 Atl. 237 (19o).
'Ibid.
'Ellis v. Kimball, x6 Pick. 132 (Mass. 1834); Rychman v. Delavan, 25
Wend. 185 (N. Y. 1840).
'Newell, op. cit. supra. §§ 337, 338; Ostenberg v. Plamondson, 35 Can. L.
T. 262 (1914); Watson v. Detroit Journal Co., 143 Mich. 430, lO7 N. W. 81

(i9o6).
7

Ibid.
'Reilly v. Curtis, 83 N. J. L. 77, 84 Atl. i99 (1912); Levert v. Daily
States Pub. Co.. 123 La. 594, 49 So. 206 (igog).
9 Smallwood v. York, 163 Ky. 139, 173 S. W. 380 (914).
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a building," has been held to have a right of action. n However, even though
the nominal object of the libel is a large class, if the libel can be shown to
have been intended and generally understood to apply specifically to the plaintiff, he is entitled to redress." Similarly, where a part only of a small group is
impersonally referred to, the plaintiff cannot recover unless he establishes the
special application of the publication to himself.P Since criminal liability for
libel rests, unlike civil liability, upon the tendency of the libel to provoke a
breach of the peace, ' it is immaterial, in a criminal prosecution, that the class
referred to is large and that the libel has no specific application to any individual. The principal case should admit of no doubt, inasmuch as the plaintiff
was specifically referred to by name.3 6

MARRIAGE-INSANE

PERSONS-ANNULMENT

AFTER

THE DEATH

OF TnE

INcomPETENT-Complainant seeks to annul the marriage entered into by his
brother, now deceased, on the ground of the latter's insanity at the time of the
marriage. A statute of the state enumerates certain marriages as void, marriage with an insane person not being so classified. Held, that the marriage was
merely voidable under the statute, valid until avoided in a direct proceeding
during the life-time of the parties, and a collateral attack on the ground of
insanity, made after the death of the incompetent, by his surviving relative,
cannot succeed. Ellis v. Ellis, 119 So. 3o4 (Miss. 1928).
Courts, unfettered by a statute, generally follow the common law rule
that marriage to an insane person is absolutely void, on the principle of ordinary contracts which requires the intelligent assent of both parties. It will be
so declared in any proceeding in which the question may arise, whether during
"0 Fitzpatrick v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 184 Ala. 5IO, 63 So. 98o (913)
Dunlap v. Sundberg, 55 Wash. 6o9, 104 Pac. 83o (i9o9).
'Cases where a member of the class was held to have no right of action:
Comes v. Cruce, 85 Ark. 79, 107 S. W. I85 (i9o8) ; Ewell v. Bontwell, 138
Va. 402, 121 S.E. 912 (1924) ; Lynch v. Kirby, 74 Misc. 266, 131 N. Y. Supp.

68o (I91).

' Ostenberg v. Plamondson, supra note 6: International Text Book Co. v.
Leader Printing Co., i89 Fed. 86 (N. D. Ohio igio) ; contra, Watson v. Detroit
Journal Co., supranote 6.
"Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, I H. L. Cas. 637 (I848).
'

State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828) ; Newell, op. cit. supra note I.

State v. Brady, 44 Kan. 435,

24

Pac. 948 (i8go); Crane v. State, 14

Ola. Cr. 30, i66 Pac. 11o (1917).

'The dissent is presumably based on the ground that, since the plaintiff's
name is one of a great number, the libel cannot be said to have any specific
application to the plaintiff.
'Wightman v. Wightman, 4 John. Ch. 343 (N. Y. i82o); Ward v. Dulaney, 23 Miss. 410, 433 (1852) (before the statute); I BIsHoP, MARu. & Div.
(6th ed. 1881) § 136.
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the life of the parties or after their death.' Though void in itself, it is desirable, in order to remove all doubt as to the status of the parties, to secure a
decree of nullity.' Where, on the other hand, statutes have been passed regulating marriage, though they expressly prohibit the marriage of an insane
person, most courts declare such a marriage voidable, not void, and subject to
attack only in a direct proceeding during the life-time of the parties.' As a
result collateral attacks by third parties are discouraged.' More than this, in
some cases, the right to avoid is further limited to the insane person, on his
recovery, or one acting for him,' and it is extended only to the sane party who
married in good faith, believing the other was sane.7 It is a question whether
this tendency, illustrated by the principal case, to restrict by statute the right
and opportunity to avoid such marriages, is a welcome change from the common law rule,' or may cause injustice, as far as civil rights are concerned, in
the case, for example, where death occurs before a direct proceeding can be
instituted.'

Possaso,N-DEL~rvEay or KEY To SAFE: DEPosIT Box-The testatrix be-

queathed to X "all the articles of every kind owned by me which may be in
her possession at the time of my death." A few months prior to her death
the testatrix placed a key to her safe deposit box in a bag under the mattress
of the bed in the spare chamber of X's house, saying to X, ".
. in case
anything happens to me, you have the key in your possession." X thereafter
retained the sole key to this chamber. There was no arrangement for X to go
to the deposit box in the testatrix's lifetime, and she did not go until after her
'Browning v. Reane, 2 Phill. 69 (Eng. 1812); Bell v. Bennett, 73 Ga.
784 (1884); Sothern v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 936 (E. D. Ark. 1926);
(1927) 36 YATE L. J. 577.
'Ex parte Turing, i Ves. & Beames 140 (Eng. 1812); Crump v. Morgan,
3 Ired. Eq. 91 (N. C. 1843); but cf. Snedden v. Snedden, 39 Pa. C. C. 222
(1911) (courts lack jurisdiction to issue decree).
'In re Gregorson, 16o Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 6o (1911); Guthery v. Wetzel,
205 Mo. App. 664, 226 S. W. 626 (ig2o) ; Kuehne v. Kuehne, 185 Wis. 195, 201
N. W. 5o6 (1924).
'Inhabitants of Goshen v. Inhabitants of Richmond, 4 Allen 458 (Mass.
1862) ; Wiser v. Lockwood, 42 Vt. 720 (1870) ; Henderson v. Hefhderson, 265
Mo. 718, 178 S. W. 175 (915).
Makey v. Peters, 22 App. D. C. 341 (1903).

SDaniele v. Margulies, 95 N. J. Eq. 9, 121 AtI. 772 (1923); Lewis v.
Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 125 (189o); Hoadley v. Hoadley, 244 N. Y. 424, 155 N.
E. 728 (1927) (sane may not sue under statute, but statute, as amended later,
allows it, as noted in (1928) 6 N. Y. LAW Rav. i5o).
'A somewhat similar change is to be found in the law as to marriages by
persons under age of consent. People v. Slack, 15 Mich. 193 (1867) (statute
makes it voidable) ; Io Am. & ENG. Excy. oF LAW (1889) 622-623 (indicates
that some statutes make it voidable only upon the assent of the incapable
party).
'2 NELsox, Div. & SEP. (1895) §672; i BIsiiop, MARR. SF'. & Div. (6th
ed. 1891) §§636-640.
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death. However, the testatrix had frequent access to the box by the use of a
duplicate key. Held, that the contents of the safe deposit box were not in the
possession of X at the testatrix's death. Ferguson v. South Dartmouth Cemnetery Ass'n, et al., 163 N. E. 877 (Mass. 1928).
Although fundamental' possession is one of the most unsatisfactory terms
in the law, because of the varied constructions of it.' Thus, in the instant case,
the testatrix may be construed to have meant de facto possession,' or legal pbssession," either actual' or constructive.6 The court in its opinion' did not decide
in what sense the testatrix used possession. Obviously X did not have de facto
possession. Accordingly, the strongest case that can be made for X must be
based on legal possession. It is generally held by courts' and writers ' that
two elements must be present for legal possession to exist, i. e., the intent to
control as possessor, and some power to physically control, the res of possession.
At very early common law, a manual delivery of the res was always required
to satisfy the requisite element of physical control,"6 but later decisions have
recognized a delivery of a key as sufficient where the res could not be physically
transferred by reason of its bulk u on the theory that everything possible has
been done to effectively transfer actual control out of the deliveror into the
'In all branches of the law, the ascertainment of the nature of legal possession is indispensable. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (i881) 206; HoLLAiD,JURISPRUDENCE
2

(Ioth ed. 1905) I85.

Philosophers, lawyers, and jurists have been in hopeless confusion as
to the exact meaning of possession and the requisites thereof. HoLMES, loc. cit.
supra note I, et seq.; BENTHAM, GENERAL VIEW OF A COMPLETED CODE OF LAws,
i88; SALMOND, JurXsPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1913) 236.
"'De facto possession may be paraphrased as effective occupation or control" of the res. PoLocK AND WRIGHT, POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW
(1888) 12.
"When the fact of control is coupled with a legal claim and right to
exercise it in one's name against the world, we have legal possession.' Ibid., I6.
Actual legal possession exists when the possessor has control of the res
and intends to exercise that control against the world. Terry, Possession (i918>
13 Ii. L. REv. 312, 315, reprinted in WIGMORE, CEm.nRATED LEGA. EssAYs;
(1919)

170, 173.

"Constructive possession is that which exists in the contemplating of the
law, Without actual personal occupati6n. 3 Bouv. L, Dicr. (8th ed. 1914) 2636.
7 63 N. E. 877, 878.
'State v. Shaw, 67 Oh. St. 157, 65 N. E. 875 (192o) ; Denny v. Warren,
x6 Mass. 42o (182o). However, one of the elements is usually admitted to be
present, so the controversy hinges upon the other. Thus there is one class of
cases in which the intent is the deciding factor. Queen v. Ashwell, 16 Q. B. D_
19o (1885) ; Cartwright v. Green, 8 Ves. Jr. 405 (803).

In the "key" cases,

the physical control is the important element.
1 (1899) 48 CENT. L. J. 5I; Terry, loc. cit. supra:note 5; HOLMES, op. Cit.
sufpra note I, at :26; Bingham, Nature and Importance of Legal Possessiok
(1915) 13 MIcH. L. REv. 535, 549.
", (1921) 93 CENT. L. J. 392.

' Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (i898) ; Cooper v. Burr,
45 Barb. 9 (N. Y. 1855); Debinson v. Emmons, 158 Mass. 592, 33 N. E.
706 (1893).
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deliveree, and therefore such delivery is equivalent to a manual delivery.' But
where the res is physically deliverable, whether present," or neither present or
accessible,' there is open conflict in the decisions. Following the theory that
everything must be done to divest the deliveror of control, it would seem that
the deliveree would not obtain possession in either situation. However, some
courts have gone so far as to hold that delivery of a key to a remote receptacle
transfers possession of its deliverable contents to the deliveree, even though a
duplicate key is held by another person.? But it is doubtful whether even these
courts would decide that the deliveree had possession where the holder of the
other key used it repeatedly to afford access to the receptacle, as did the testatrix in the instant case, because all vestige of the deliveree's control is
thereby eradicated. Viewing X's case in the most favorable light, it must fail,
and even eliminating the duplicate key from the facts, the better rule would
seem to deny her judgment.
TAXATION-INcoME TAX-MEAsURE OF TAXABLE GAiN U oN STOcKs
By GIr AND SOLD BY TEE DONEE-By Act of Congress it is

TANsFERRED

provided that, for income tax purposes, "In case of property, acquired by gift
.

.

. ,

the basis (for ascertaining the gain derived by a subsequent sale by

the donee) shall be the same as that which it would have in the hands of the
donor or the last preceding owner by whom it was not acquired by gift."'
The donee of stocks petitioned to recover income taxes exacted because of
advancement in the market value of those stocks while in the hands of the
donor. Held, that he could not recover. Taft v. Bowers, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided Feb. x8, 1929.

' Some courts decide that the deliveree receives constructive possession in
this situation. Newman v. Bost, supra note ii; Marsh v. Fuller, i8 N. H. 36o
(1846). At best this is merely an illusory, meaningless term, which only
tends to confuse an already tangled subject. It would be far better, if courts
are to give the effect of actual possession to constructive possession, to enlarge
the definition of possession to include it.
"The cases that fiold the view that such is a valid delivery proceed on the
ground that the receptacle is delivered, and everything therein is included.
Cooper v. Burr, supra note II; Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300 (1710).

On the

other hand, is the doctrine that the articles in the receptacle are capable of
manual delivery, even though the receptacle is not. Newman v. -Bost, supra
note ii (insurance policy in drawer of bureau held not to pass into deliveree's
possession) ; Knight v. Tripp, 121 Cal. 674, 54 Pac. 267 (1898).
" Some courts hold that delivery of the key divests deliveror of the sole
means of control, and therefore gives the deliveree possession or constructive
possession. Marsh v. Fuller, supra note i2; Snido v. Brotherton, 140 Va. 187,
124 S. E. 182 (1924).
The opposing view maintains that no actual possession
is thus vested in deliveree. Keepers v. Fidelity Title, etc., Co., 56 N. J. L. 302,
28 Atl. 585 (1893) (trunks were in the next room); Hall v. Hall, 20 Ont. Rep.
684 (189i). For a good summary of this type of case, see note (1912) 40 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 9oi.
'Thomas v. Lewis, 89 Va. I, 15 S. E. 389 (1892) ; Herrick v. Dennett,
203 Mass. 17, 89 N. E. 141 (909).
'REVENUE

ACT, i92I,

c. 136, 42

STAT. 227,

§ 202, par.

2.
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Income has been defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined? It includes profits derived from the sale of capital assets?
And it does not alter the situation that the profit has been realized from a single
isolated sale of stock held as an investment, rather than from sales in a business
of buying and selling such property: The petitioner's contention in the principal case did not contravene these principles, but proceeded upon the theory
that the gift of the stock became a capital asset in the donee's hands to the
extent of its value at the time of the transfer, and that, therefore, when the
stock was sold by the donee, no part of its increase in value while owned by the
donor could be treated as taxable income to him within the Sixteenth Amendment? If this contention were sound the increase of the stocks' value prior to
the transfer to the donee could not be taxed as income at all, because, inasmuch
as no increase in value not actually realized in cash or property can be taxed as
income,' it is obvious that no such tax could be assessed against the donor.
Yet when this increase in value is finally realized as the result of the donee's
sale there is at that time a profit derived from capital assets, which, as has
been pointed out, is income and should therefore be taxable.7 The act with
which we are concerned affords a means for collecting this revenue made
available by the Sixteenth Amendment. If it had seen fit Congress might
well have imposed a tax upon the donor for making the gift,8 and the tax
could have been measured by the difference between the price the donor paid
for the stock and its value when he transferred it? But it seemed preferable
to tax the gain as income when realized by the donee's sale, and this seems
the fairer course, because, as is remarked by the circuit court," the donee has
paid nothing for the stock and therefore loses nothing.
TAXATION-STATUTORY VALUATION OF No-PAR VALUE SToCK-PRoPORTIONAL TAX ON CAPITAL STOCK OF FOREIGN CORPORATION DOING INTERSTATE

Busn ESs-Plantiff, a foreign corporation engaged in both interstate and intrastate business, sought to enjoin the collection of a Missouri franchise tax,
assessed under a statute 1 declaring that for computation of taxes based cf the
v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (I92O).
'Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U. S. 247, 42 Sup. Ct. 483 (1922).
'Merchants' Loan Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct 386 (1921).
The Amendment provides: "Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several states. .. ."
'Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 2.
When the principal case was before the circuit court of appeals, Hand,
J., said: ". . . that the whole gain is income cannot . . . be disputed. The
language of the Amendment itself gives Congress power to lay 'taxes on incomes,' not on persons." Bowers v. Taft, 20 F. (2d) 561, 564 (C. C. A. 2d,
2Eisner

1927).

'Anderson v. McNeir, I6 F. (2d) 970 (927).
'Bowers v. Taft, supra note 7, at 563.
Ibid., at 563.
I LAws

Mo. 1921, § 12,

p. 661.
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value of shares of stock, no-par value stock should be considered as worth $ioo
per share. The plaintiff had total assets of $97,oooooo, and had outstanding

3,760,ooo no-par shares of common stock. It -as taxed on such proportion of
the value of the capital stock as the assets in Missouri bore to the total. Held,
that this method of computing the tax is not invalid as placing a burden on
interstate commerce. InternationalShoe Co. v. Shartel, 29 F. (2d) 6o4 (W. D.
Mo. 1928).
The tax in question was a franchise tax, applicable to foreign and domestic
corporations alike.' All of the objections as to due process, unequal protection
of the laws, arbitrary classification without uniformity, and no lawful proportion of value were found by the court to have been settled in Roberts & S. Co. v.
Emmerson. This decision, reversing some previous state court holdings* contra,
seems to have conclusively settled the law that no-par value stock is sufficiently
different to justify a separate classification, and that this is based on a reasonable taxing policy 5 The only remaining question, then, was whether Missouri
was burdening interstate commerce by requiring the plaintiff to pay for doing
business in the state. It is settled that a state may not impose a privilege tax on
a foreign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce Buat a state may
tax a corporation's property permanently located within its limits, if the ascertainment of the amount is made dependent in fact on the value of property situated within the state." When the tax is simply a certain percentage of the entire
capital stock, it is a burden if there is no maximum amount and even where
there is a maximum according to the latest decision of the Supreme Court
And when the amount is found by a proportion of the authorized capital, even
though the proportion be based on business done in the state, the commerce clause
is violated0 But when the tax is on a proportion of the outstanding capital
'So held in State v. Petroleum Corp., 2 S. W. (2d) 790 (Mo. I928).
327I U. S. 50, 46 Sup. Ct. 375, 45 A. L. R. 1495 (1926), which affirmed 313
Ill. 37, i44 N. E. 818 (1924).

tPeople ex rel. Taxi Corp. v. Walsh. 2o2 App. Div. 65i, 195 N. Y. Supp.
184 (1922) ; and see annotation in

(1923)

36 A. L. R. 791, 796.

'Roberts & S. Co. v. Emmerson, supra note 3, at 57; State v. Margay Oil
Corp., 167 Ark. 614, 62i, 260 S. W. 63, 6 ('925), which also holds that the
principle is applicable equally when foreign are taxed with domestic corporations. This decision was affirmed in 273 U. S. 666, 47 Sup. Ct 458 (1927).
'Alpha Cement Co. v. Mass., 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477 '(1924); see

Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 (i928).
'Postal Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 15 Sup. Ct. 268 (0895);
Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. i, 3o Sup. Ct i9o (19io).
'Looney v. Crane, 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 78 (1917).

'Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, U. S. Sup. Ct, decided Feb. i8, 1929, holding (Holmes and Brandeis dissenting) invalid a Washington tax on the authorized capital of all corporations, with a $3000 maximum, and disapproving Baltic
Mining Co. v. Mass., 231 U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct. i5 (i913), which upheld a statute
providing for a $2ooo maximum.

"°Air-Way Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12 (1924), in which
the tax was held to be an unconstitutional discrimination, since other corporations doing as large a business and owning property of equal or greater value
might have a smaller authorized capital.
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stock, determined by the value of property in the jurisdiction, the tax is valid,
whether on property or imposed as a franchise tax." Under this rule the fact
that interstate commerce is affected incidentally does not matter, and the decision
in the principal case would therefore seem to be correct, unless it was open to
the court to consider the justice, as to the plaintiff, of the method of valuation."
TRiAL-NON-PEcUNIARY INTEREST OF TamAL JUDGE AS GROUNDS FOR His
DisQuALiFicATioN-The petitioner, the Legislature of New Jersey, alleged that
the trial judge was biased and prejudiced in the trial of the cause because of
political connections and opinions adverse to those of the petitioner. The relief
sought was the prevention of the said judge from trying the case. Held, that
the petition be dismissed. Ex parte Hague, 143 At]. 826 (N. J. i928).
It has long been a settled principle of the law that no judge is competent to
try his own cause.' As early as the time of Lord Coke it was said that if an
Act of Parliament purported to make such action valid it would be void as
against natural justice.' Accordingly it has been generally held that, where a
judge has a substantial pecuniary interest in the subject matter of the suit, he is
disqualified from sitting, because, in effect, he is trying his own cause.' So a
judge cannot probate a will when he is executor of the estate,' nor can he try a
case in which a corporation is a party when he is a stockholder thereofr nor can
he adjudge bankruptcy proceedings when he is a creditor of the estate.' But
the rule is different, in the absence of statutes, where bias and prejudice of a
judge is not supported by pecuniary interest.s Thus mere business relationship,'
Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emnmerson (privilege tax), 258 U. S. 90, 42 Sup. Ct.
305 (1922).

' In Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276 (1918),
the court rejected a method of valuation which had previously been upheld when
imposed by another state in Pullman Co. v. Pa., 141 U. S. i8, 11 Sup. Ct. 876
(189i). The court said: "But if the plan pursued is arbitrary and the consequent valuation grossly excessive, it must be condemned because of conflict with
the commerce clause or the Fourteenth Amendment or both." There, as in the
principal case, it was a statute which determined the method of valuation. There,
as here, the Supreme Court had held the same method to be a just measure in a
former case. But in the Tank Line case the court did not hesitate to consider
the fairness of the method as regarded the plaintiff, whereas in the principal
case the court seemed to feel that this was no longer open to its consideration, a
conclusion which would seem to be wrong in view of the holding in the Tank
Line case.
'In re Conant, io2 Me. 477, 67 Atl. 564 (i9o7) ; Sigourney v. Sibley, 21
Pick. io1 (Mass. 1838); CooLEY, Con siTuioNAL. LImrTATIoxs (8th ed. 1927)
870.
2Co. Lir. § 212.
'Petition of New Boston, 29 N. H. 328 (i87o) ; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass.
324 (186) ; In. re White, 37 Cal. 19o (1869).
'Knight
v. Hardeman, 17 Ga. 253 (I855).
6
In re Honolulu Oil Co., 243 Fed. 348 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
6
Thornton v. Moore, 6i Ala. 347 (1878).
"State v. Superior Court, 14 Ariz. 126, 125 Pac. 707 (1912); State v.
Morgan, 142 La. 755, 77 So. 588 (917) ; Bryan v. State, 41 Fla. 643, 26 So.
1022 (1899).
'Purvis v. Funk, 55 Fla. 715, 46 So. 171 (1908).
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or social ' or political '" interest are generally held to be insufficient grounds for
removal, for the reason that it cannot be presumed that the judge will violate his
sacred oath of office in such cases. The distinction seems to be wholly arbitrary
and unfounded. If the judge has a substantial interest or prejudice in the litigation, no matter what the cause may be, it would seem to be more in harmony
with principles of justice that he be prevented from trying the case. On the
other hand, it can be argued that great difficulty would arise in determining
whether or not a substantial prejudice, not based on pecuniary interest, existed;
and many unnecessary disputes and controversies would follow. However, the
United States Supreme Court has recently held' that when a judge sits on a.
case in which he' has a substantial pecuniary interest the due process clause of
the federal Constitution is violated. It is possible that in the course of time this
provision may be invoked as a means of invalidating future decisions in accord
with that in the principal case.
In re Carter, 193 App. Div. 356, 184 N. Y. Supp. 40 (1920).
; Elliot v. Hipp, 134
Fulton v. Longshore, 156 Ala. 61, 46 So. 989 (o8)
Ga. 844, 68 S. E. 736 (gio).
' Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927).
10

